On November 15, 2026, Summit Therapeutics announced that the FDA had declined to approve its application for ivonescimab plus chemotherapy in patients with EGFR-mutated non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) following EGFR TKI treatment. The agency issued a Complete Response Letter (CRL), meaning the application could not be approved in its present form.

The global Phase 3 HARMONi trial had met its progression-free survival (PFS) endpoint. Median PFS improved from 4.4 to 6.8 months (HR 0.52). But the study did not demonstrate a statistically significant improvement in overall survival (OS), a co-primary endpoint.

And there was another problem.

According to the FDA's November 13 CRL, 257 of 275 PFS events (approximately 93%) came from patients enrolled in China, although those patients represented about 60% of the study population. Enrollment in China began in January 2022, while enrollment in North America and Europe did not begin until May 2023.

The FDA questioned whether the findings could be applied to the U.S. population and whether the modest PFS improvement justified the additional toxicity. Subsequent post-hoc analyses with longer follow-up were not considered confirmatory; the agency also noted different data cutoff dates across regions.

What makes this setback interesting is how long some of these concerns existed. The FDA first raised the trial's geographic enrollment strategy with Summit in March 2023, and again in May 2025.

Meanwhile, oncologists were publicly discussing the scientific uncertainties well before the application was rejected.

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As scientific concerns emerged during Phase 3 development and the company moved toward a potential launch, what role should Medical Affairs have played in helping the organization assess the evidence and understand the risks?

Timeline of FDA and oncologist concerns about ivonescimab, 2023 to 2026

Timeline not showing? View it online.

A promising molecule, but a different regulatory question

First, some context is important. Ivonescimab is a bispecific antibody targeting PD-1 and VEGF-A. The idea is to combine immune checkpoint inhibition with anti-angiogenic activity in one molecule. It's a compelling scientific concept, particularly given the interest in combining immunotherapy and VEGF inhibition across oncology.

The drug was developed by Akeso and is already approved in China. Summit licensed development and commercialization rights across several major markets, including the United States. For Summit, this was also its first prospective commercial pharmaceutical product. And HARMONi was only one part of a much larger development program.

Summit is investigating ivonescimab in first-line lung cancer, colorectal cancer, urothelial cancer, renal cell carcinoma and other combinations. AstraZeneca completed a $2 billion strategic equity investment in Summit in October 2026 to support further development, including combinations with antibody-drug conjugates.

There were legitimate reasons for excitement. However, believing in the potential of a molecule and believing that a particular evidence package is sufficient for regulatory approval are different things.

I think that distinction is central to this case.

Scientific signals in real time

KOL Pulse recently published an extensive analysis tracing ivonescimab from the early HARMONi-A findings through the global HARMONi study, physician reactions, and the FDA decision.

The work is worth reading because it preserves what oncologists were saying at the time, rather than reconstructing their reactions after the outcome was known.

Reading the KOL Pulse commentary alongside the FDA documents, a few things stand out.

The FDA and the oncologists weren't asking the same questions. The FDA's concerns were regulatory: whether results driven largely by patients enrolled in China would apply to U.S. patients, and whether the evidence package was adequate without a statistically significant survival benefit. The oncologists' questions were scientific. At ASCO in 2024, Tejas Patil, Aakash Desai and Nathan Pennell questioned how the HARMONi-A results fit with earlier immunotherapy data and how much of the benefit PD-1 blockade actually contributed beyond chemotherapy and VEGF inhibition.

Where the two lines of questioning met was benefit-risk. At WCLC in September 2025, discussant Suresh Ramalingam asked whether PD-1 blockade added meaningful benefit and whether it justified the additional toxicity. Fourteen months later, the FDA reached a related conclusion: the modest PFS improvement did not outweigh the added risks.

None of these concerns guaranteed the outcome. But they arrived through different channels, formal regulatory meetings on one side and congress presentations and physician commentary on the other. That's what makes them easy to treat as separate issues, and why it matters who inside an organization is looking at them together.

It's important not to confuse HARMONi-A with the later global HARMONi study. The 2024 concerns centered on the China-only study and the underlying scientific rationale. They did not necessarily predict the regulatory outcome of the subsequent application.

Nor were physicians unanimous. Several considered the results promising, and the subsequent FDA decision itself prompted debate about consistency across oncology approval standards.

Still, the sequence is worth examining. Questions about the mechanism, the survival benefit, geographic applicability, and whether the added benefit justified the toxicity were not obscure issues emerging only after the FDA decision. They were part of an ongoing scientific conversation.

And that brings us to Medical Affairs.

Where was Medical Affairs?

The public record doesn't tell us what Summit's Medical Affairs team heard, recommended, or escalated. The following questions are about what Medical Affairs could contribute, not a reconstruction of Summit's internal deliberations.

Summit had Medical Affairs leadership and was building its Field Medical organization as it prepared for a potential launch.

Its published Medical Affairs roles included scientific exchange, KOL engagement, evidence generation, clinical development collaboration and bringing medical insights into organizational planning. All familiar responsibilities in Medical Affairs.

Since FDA feedback was already a direct input into Summit's regulatory decision-making, Medical Affairs wouldn't have needed to discover it through field insights. Its distinct potential contribution was understanding how oncologists interpreted the evidence, where their concerns overlapped with regulatory questions, and what those perspectives meant for the organization's assumptions.

Field Medical was positioned to hear the questions external experts were asking and how they were reading the evidence. Those questions ranged from the relevance of PFS and emerging survival data to study design, adverse events, and what PD-1 inhibition actually added.

The real question is whether scientific concerns could be synthesized and brought to the appropriate decision owners. Influence might mean identifying an evidence gap, revising scientific communications or launch contingencies, recommending additional analyses, or explicitly documenting a decision to accept the remaining risk. It doesn't necessarily mean changing the filing decision.

Leadership may have understood the risks and deliberately decided to proceed.

Which brings me to something I think we don't discuss enough.

What if Medical Affairs raised the concerns and was overruled?

Imagine you're leading Medical Affairs at a biotech working toward its first commercial launch.

Your team is hearing repeated questions about the evidence. Regulatory has identified uncertainties. Clinical Development sees a potentially valuable therapy, and the company is preparing for launch.

You believe the regulatory risk is substantial.

You bring your assessment to leadership, explain the potential consequences and recommend that the organization reconsider some assumptions.

Leadership decides to proceed anyway.

Did Medical Affairs fail?

Not necessarily.

Drug development involves uncertainty. Companies routinely make decisions without complete evidence. The CEO, Clinical Development, Regulatory and other decision-makers must weigh scientific, regulatory, financial and patient considerations.

Medical Affairs may contribute to that assessment without owning the final decision. And being overruled isn't automatically evidence that an organization is dysfunctional. But there are responsibilities that remain, regardless of the decision.

The evidence must still be communicated accurately. Evidence gaps cannot simply disappear from the scientific narrative. And Medical Affairs should not be expected to convert scientific uncertainty into confidence because the organization has committed to a particular strategy.

I think there's an important distinction between supporting a business decision and endorsing every assumption behind it. You can disagree with a decision and still carry out your responsibilities professionally.

But what happens when leadership no longer wants to hear the concerns? Or when the scientific narrative told externally no longer matches what’s understood internally?

That's a different problem.

At that point, scientific accountability may require additional escalation, clearer documentation, and difficult conversations about what the organization is asking Medical Affairs to support.

Scientific exchange isn't the same as scientific influence

Most of us in Medical Affairs know the pattern. We measure what we can document: engagements completed, insights captured, advisory boards conducted, scientific presentations delivered.

Those activities matter. But they don't tell us whether the organization made better decisions.

The Summit case is a useful way to look at that gap.

Picture an MSL in the room at the WCLC Presidential Symposium in September 2025. A KOL questions whether PD-1 blockade adds meaningful benefit and whether it justifies the added toxicity. Over the following weeks, oncologists in that MSL's territory raise the same doubts.

The MSL documents it in the CRM. Someone categorizes it, probably under mechanism of action or efficacy perceptions. It gets consolidated with other insights. Eventually, it appears in a monthly or quarterly report. Maybe it reaches leadership.

Meanwhile, Regulatory is working through the FDA's concerns about enrollment. Clinical Development is interpreting the survival data. Each function holds part of the picture.

Does anyone put those pieces side by side and recognize that external experts are questioning whether the clinical benefit justifies the toxicity, an issue the FDA would later raise in its assessment? Or does the insight remain another data point in a system designed to demonstrate activity?

We don't know what happened inside Summit. But this is how it plays out in many organizations, and it's why collecting insights isn't the same as using them.

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An insight is valuable not simply because it was collected, but because someone understands what it means for the evidence strategy, the patient population, the product or the business.

And that requires more than an effective MSL team.

  • Medical Affairs leadership with the credibility and access to challenge assumptions.

  • An organization willing to consider uncomfortable scientific assessments.

  • Clear decision rights so scientific concerns reach people with the authority to act.

Medical Affairs can have excellent scientific capabilities and still have limited organizational influence. That's not necessarily a training problem. It may be an accountability and operating-model problem.

What the Summit case does, and doesn't, tell us

I want to be careful here.

Summit's regulatory setback does not prove that its Medical Affairs organization failed. We don't know what was discussed internally, what recommendations were made, or how executives evaluated competing scientific interpretations.

There were also credible arguments for continuing development. Ivonescimab demonstrated meaningful antitumor activity, Akeso had accumulated clinical experience in China, and the broader development program continues to investigate the molecule in other settings.

A disappointing regulatory outcome doesn't invalidate every underlying scientific hypothesis. And an unsuccessful filing doesn't automatically mean the decision to submit was unreasonable.

But the case illustrates something worth examining.

A company can have experienced scientific leaders, active external engagement, extensive clinical data and formal regulatory interactions, yet still face difficult questions about how scientific uncertainty was interpreted and acted upon.

So what can we learn from it?

Not that the outcome was predictable. Almost every high-profile asset attracts skeptics, and in hindsight their warnings always look obvious.

The more useful lesson is how to recognize a meaningful scientific signal while the decision is still open.

In this case, concerns came from different directions. The FDA questioned whether the trial results were applicable to the U.S. population. Oncologists questioned the contribution of PD-1 blockade. And the clinical discussion at WCLC overlapped with the FDA's eventual benefit-risk assessment on a central issue: whether the observed benefit justified the additional toxicity.

These weren't identical criticisms, but they challenged different parts of the same evidence package.

That doesn't mean the critics were necessarily right, or that the eventual regulatory outcome was inevitable. But when concerns emerge from different sources, challenge material assumptions, and persist as new evidence becomes available, they deserve more than a response to each objection individually.

Someone needs to step back and ask what they mean collectively for the development strategy, the evidence package, and the decisions being made.

AstraZeneca's $2 billion investment, completed on October 5, 2026, 39 days before the FDA's November 13 letter, is another reminder that confidence in a molecule's broader potential is not the same as confidence in one regulatory application. Companies can make different decisions about different opportunities within the same development program.

For Medical Affairs, that leaves a question extending well beyond Summit.

If external experts repeatedly challenge assumptions that matter to your development or launch strategy, can you show how those signals informed the organization's decisions?

If leadership chose to proceed despite those concerns, were the underlying risks understood, documented, and consciously accepted?

Medical Affairs doesn't have to win every argument to be effective.

But it does need the ability to raise one, have it seriously considered and maintain its scientific integrity regardless of the outcome.

Because scientific accountability isn't only about how accurately we communicate evidence externally. It's also about how effectively we help the organization understand that evidence internally.

Medical Affairs cannot guarantee a good decision. But it should help ensure that the scientific risks behind a decision are understood.

Try this before your next portfolio or launch-readiness review

Think about a consequential external scientific concern your team has heard about a product.

Does it challenge an assumption underlying your development strategy, evidence plan, or launch readiness?

If so, which decision could it inform, and who actually has the authority to act on it?

Can you trace whether that concern reached the decision owner as a scientific assessment, what was considered, and what was ultimately decided?

Reply with how your team decides which concerns get escalated (no product specifics needed). I'll tell you how I'd pressure-test that process.

Are Your Insights Reaching the People Who Make Decisions?

At Talmedica, I help Medical Affairs leaders assess whether field insights are evaluated, escalated appropriately, and considered by the people who own the decisions.

If your insight reports are full but you cannot trace how they informed decisions, let's talk.

Sources and further reading

This commentary examines publicly available evidence and its implications for Medical Affairs practice. It does not assess confidential internal deliberations or attribute responsibility to individual Summit employees.